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September 2 , , 197 3
fil'J\'IJ:,H-:N'I' OF' SENi\'I'OR l\UKE t-1i\N.SFlF.LD (0 ., t-10NT . )

t1me for i\merica

1s

lt

Lo

replnc~

n pol1cy of foreign landbased

nJl111ry omuprcsancc •..;ith a po11c\ of disc-•rning internationalism .
'l'hc

dJOc

n hn nl
.~n~

p1oV1.;ionn
(1)

T h:·lVe

not

I"<'C{IIit·c

off~

red w i l 1 s L 1 11111 I, 11 e Lhn l. process .

c-omplex .

In bncr

it

Its

wtll

a reduc:tion by 50 X of llH• lantlbascd military

pcr .• onncl sL1l ioned on foreign :-;oJ 1 ovvr n three-year period;

(2)
ca ·h oi
(3)

provide that at least 25% of: thf" total be accomplished in
1 he•

l ll t·ce years;

Jh:nnlL Lh.; Executive hr<lnch to al discretion to determ1nc

fr01n ~,o,.lnch co .nt ries thQSC reduct~ons \-.tll be made .

Tlw .imcndntC'nl

simply

reco<Jni.ze~

miltt.uy P•'rsonncl ar.e presently

that .tpproximately 500,000

sto~ltonc•d

on foreign soil and seeks

lO rc·cllt<'l' 1111s fiyurc Lo approximC\Lllly ~SO,Ol)O by June 30 ,
1'1H: lllllll iHhnc'nl
1111

would not affec:L

Ol

1976.

n•dl tcc· tho acld.i.t.ional 100,000

1 1 l.tJ'Y p(' rr-;on ne l a f loa L off f.o rc iqn sl1o res .

Thus , under the to rms

of til<" ctmr ndmL!nt. approximately B:> , nno mJ llLar.y personnel musL b12
rctunf'{l

o th0 UnJ.ted Stales by ,June· 30 ,

1974 .

The President.

\ovOull have to u.l discrctton from .... htch countries these 85 , 000

co 1l 1 he r< 1 tovNl (i.e. , Ok ina\va and Tha 1.1 <1 nd could account. for

-2ir.c

1.1

hc"'mo).

p·, ,l))O

J(

Only ron"i

l t lu l0d 1n Lhe
J\11d

l.1<~

ly,

,t

the Presldcnl

~ho:-;e

rl!lurn these t:rovps

shore hosed milltnt·y }P t:sonnel would be

amputation for· elJ

~ lllit.y

xor reduction .

Lie amC'ndmnnt rcmalnf.i ne1 rul on the question of

d ·rtobllizatJon of the personnel returnt•d.
~H• ~wuces

,,>

It

~s

my

bel~ef

that the

to m.dnt .. in a st.:andinq 1\rmy 1n pt•acr•Lime thcough volunteers

\-.111 !"Jgnifi<.·ont ly shrink Lhe overall ~azc· .>[ tile military force

In

la:-; respect.: thl.s nmendmcnl ,.. ould complement that

1 o c0c.:1st <1nd comp lcmcn L as w~ l l

the

tnan1mous uction hy the Senate

Atmttl Services C)nunittee which recomtnf!nds an overall force level
,-.. duel ion of

1~"">(,,000

by June 30 ,

197·1.

rhe cnaclmcnl of this amendment t,·ould be totally consistent
wll h

the N1xon noctdnc of \..:orlrlwido pt·csence manifested by other

than

lctnd forces on 1orcign soil.
1\ction l>y tlw Congress is long overdue.

•rhe Unl ted Stati.;!S

has slatione'!d ovcrseus mon~ than SOU , OOO military personnel.

11\

adlil1on ...molher 100,000 of military pnrsorncl are afloat away ft·om
our shores.

'J'Ims «pproximat:cly 30% of our military force is statione

beyond our home land.

Not since the Clctys of the Bd tJ.sh Empl.re--

or probably 111or.c truly, the Roman Empire--IJave so m«ny been r<=qUJred
to "maintain the peace" a\vay from out: sho~- •s.

Nany of our Post

wor-ld war II mJ.litary postures and weapons procurements, and those

-3-

of the

Un1on as well, have been

sov1~t

to '-a ·h othC'lr .
rc•spond
l

1

W:11en one superpower dcvC'lop

sl<1L1oninq

t IMt
u.~-; .

01

pol1cy of mirrored act ion

stu.LHJIIPd

l·:asl•'rn Europe .

111

uul i

In ry

1 vc

nl

nppl1.ed to the

from the West .

i3ut nolWILh-tttnding the comparatively

nnl1 t a ry overseas po ltcy of

.§_Ql 1 of_so man_y_y_.~lllP
llh' Jll.lllt..{\ry_!.pt

_illld i<•v.•l

Jj1cw clltr:__pol

ion.

ll.:~~ .

ot

this l:olnl 330,000 are

It is pr<>Slllllt'l that many of these

11 •

U1n u•d St..tLC'"i 1s hadly overextended ahrotl<.L

1l

\·•Cll!

forces in Eastern guropc a 1 e therE.' for other than an

cxlC!rn.ll th cat
n ". 'S lt t •

m1.ss1le the other

forces on forc]gn so.i 1.

appio:om,\Lc•ly 1tl!:i , OOO military pct·:.onrwl;

t

respon~~;

Sov i c•L Union has station'":d outs l<lL· Lllc Soviet Union

Pl1o

Sov i 1..

[l

or m1rrored

n k 1 nd.

only

t

Lffilldt~vc

L

ov1ec Union, the
~rcscncc

on fore1.ar1

itarv presumes a no I icy thal heav1.ly favors

In fact it is my Hclll•f th«L the comnutment

force~

ab!:9a~:!...J.!_a~!.__cl(:J_CtJnitllJcl

ou1· poLicy rather

i('y~le.!:_crminin_2_ Lh~:___!_t:_~~. s._ron:cs

abroad .

is olmo:;t beyond belief lo most Amet icans that our country

mc1inulinl=: over

:~,000

bases and installnL.lonG on [oreign soil; that

thf• OC'fens<"' D~.:par tmcnL employs di rcctly or 1nd1rcctly approximately

173,000 forC'iqn naLionals at these bases and the installations to

supporl thc>se
sLal1on~d

u.s .

Forces abroad;

·hat over 314 , 000 dcpendencs are

ovnrPcas with these military forces .

Disbelief turns to

dismay whc.:n announcements are made that bases and 1.nstal lations

-4arl
~n

t

b

closed 1n the United States and pt rsonF put out of Kork all

1~

1nter ·s

apply lo

of economy .

Econom~

1s a

• table qoal but

~t

xp •nd1 tun-s abroad as \·-ell as ex}wndJ lures at home.

should
The

1mpo mlmont by this Administration of $12 b1ll~on for domestic
prorpum~;;

the devaluation and other weakcnings of the dollar over

two yent·s approach 50%; all marshall al:.tention to this

tlw pd:,t

pol i<·y or !;hamc•ftll overseas waste .

IL cnnnot

br~

I

olcrated any longer.

'I'Itr' «mcndm~--nt now pending is directed wot·Idwiclc and not

spPclrically at Europe .
foc-u

·~· ~

The public debate over Lhc years has

prinmrl ly on Europe because l.l is there that the largest

cont lllJPnt o(

u.s . Porces is stationed.

qtlc··t ion; c<u'l be

raised to the U.S.

nut equally forceful

troops

lc\ tioncd

l.n Thal.land--

nmv ahouL 4'i , OOO; or in Okinawa--no....: ahouL 40,000; or Korea--also
rtbOUl

l(),orH);

01

'J'aiwan--about 8 , 000; or llw Philippines--about

lS,OOll; or c•vt.,ll Bermuda where about 1,000 m•n de>fend our national
111

till

rj1~a

lwo

th8 arC'dS I

r.:1cL ,
yl~ar.s

this amendment could I><· l\ll1y carried out during
of its operation by reductions entirely from

hc.lVC mentioned, Thailand, Korea, Okinawa, 'l'ai\van ,

phj l1pru ne~ .:tncl Bcnnuda,
Europ~an

\•;i thout rcmov1ng one soldier from the

Theatre.

But since Europe has become the symbol and for the opponents of
any

t100p

reduction, their strongest casC' , 1.t should be useful to

-5cxan 1.n

the pre>mises and

v~ew

the weaknesses of tlus--the strongest

Let us look at the ren.litl.es that fnc0d this Nation in 1951

case .

wh1 ch precipll ate'"

the stat 1oni ng

or

four

ll.v..L.sl.ons

~n

Europe .

Let

us look at the premises upon whicl1 the ConJlCSS assented and the
rcprcs cntatJ.ons

th~t

were made about the permanence of such a

commi tmcn t o 1 m.mpower abrcad .

u.s.

today,

•rhen let us loo}: at Europe and the

lA years after the War, 23 yeats aft0r the initial

stall.onin<J of

divis1.ons to NATO .

t hcse

EUROPE AFTER WORI,O WAR II

\·lorld

~·lnr

I I left Western guropc in

mov<'d swt ft.ly w tth

~..he

ttttt•mpLcd w1.th ..L.ts

~1arshall

nun.; .

The United States

most mass1.ve r.econstruct..L.on effort ever
Plan--an effort that has proven

su<"'ccssful beyond expectations .

Thu institutions of Europe,

polHl.cnl, l'COtlomic as well as military, \.;ere in shambles .
l hc.:;c w0nkcned c:ond i tions in g\u:opc combinud
put·cl~pt

ton ot

t.hc thn')at of the horclcs

tl"Om

\•.l

th the common

l.hc Eust a strong

nn 11 L<l ry prcsunc~e in Western Europe to comp lcmcn t

effort was rc1t:.ional.
1949,

the economic

13ut the North Atlantic 'l'rcaty,

ratified 1n

lid not commit U. S . troops to the European cont1nent .

the Trenty itself made no commitment of

u.s.

\'lith

In fact,

ground tlOops to Europe .

It ~as not until 1951 that the decision was made ~o send four land

-6! v1

on

to Europe and Congressional assent solJ.Clted to

tlus SLCJnJficant commitment of troops.

The lu.story of: proceedings before the Congress are very
revea 11 nt).
Secretary Marshall claimed at that t1mc that there was nothing
macpcnl ahout (our divisions .

The level was selected based upon a

judgment of our resources and their nvailalnlity.
same sL<mc1arct wnr.e to be applied today .

If only the

And why should it not be

applied?
Bnt even more revealing is the exchange thnt Senator Hickenloeper h<:td wit.h S('cretary Acheson when it was nmde clear that each
!;iqnatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally make its own
cletermlnat.Lon of its contribution of milJ.tary equipment, manpower
ancl facil1t:1es .

ln addition, Secretary Achc""on envJ.sioned the

return of troops subsequently sent if: l.he situation got. better.
nut what: conditions were envisioned in 19Sl that initia l ly

wan·autcd the troops to go to Euruopc and what thorny questions
should be resolved for us to expect their retln n?
of Ne,... Jersey

sou~ht

Senator Smith

this information from Ge neral Bradley in 1951

and General Bradley felt the makJ.ng of a peace treaty w1th Germany
and the state of preparedness of the other ndLions of Europe as well
as Lhe aggressive

intent~ons

of the East were the chief J.rritants

- 7that JUStifled

u.s.

action.

Ho~ interest1ng that all of these

1rr1tants have been significantly removed!
N1netcen C1fty- one was, in add1tion, n time when the Korean
War .... as underway; China was an active enemy; the Soviets had come of
nuclear ngo; the Southeast European flank was still threatened;
the Pconomtcs of Western Europe were jnst back on their feet;
political Jnstnbility was prevalent in most West European countries .
StroncJ men replilced strong institutions and prov1ded the cohesion for
Western Europe.

u.s.

But even then the questions were raised:

Should the

commlt f:our divisions to Europe as a deterrent to another

Etropcan war at least until Europe is rendy to assume its own
dcfcn f"!s?
The Congress assented to that request and the American troops
tPturrwcl to Europe to meet the threat that wns perce1.ved at that

t 1mc.

However real the threat then , hos it chanC)ed since that time?
EUROPE SINCE
When

u.s .

'rilE 'so •s

troops were initially commjttcd to the European

contlncnt, total GNP of all European NATO countries was $46 . 9
billion compared to $831.9 bill1on for 1972 .

The total exports

from all NATO countries to the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1972
amounted to $9.09 bill1on .

The imports from the USSR and Eastern

Europe to NATO countries totaled $8 . 67 billion .

In this one area

-8alon

of trade between the blocs, the most dramat1c change 1n

cl1matc must be recogn1zed.
nut even more s1gnificant than cvaluat1ng not only the

strength of WcstC'!rn Europe and apprecint1.ng the strong trade flow
between f:,st and West is the great numher of events since 1963
that manifest. ns well as sig n ificantLy cont t"ibute to the lessening

of tensions between East and West.

I

have selected eighty-two

events 1 consirlcr significant since 1963 (Sec appendix A).
rang~

tram

th~

They

hot line to the Nuclear Test nnn to the Consular

Convention to the Non-proliferation Treaty to the treaty normalizing
relclt .tons bet ween Germany and Po land; to the Soviet-West German
agreement on consulates: to the
t:o

th<~

between

SALT treaty:
I~nst

Ge~man

treat1cs with Soviet Union;

to the sign1ng o£ the trenty on relations

and West Germany.

But to many the threat of an all-

ont convnntionnl war with the hordes ft·om the Eust remains the same.
R1qld11y affects noL only the rhetoric buL tlw policy.
Eiscnho~.-;c•r

General

testifying in 1951 about Con<p:cssional responsibility

in the cletermJnatJon and the evolution of the level of

u.s.

troops

in Europe said,
I do think that Congress ought to see a respectable,
reasonable approach, and the second they see anything to
be, let's say, cockeyed and crazy, to qc>t 1nto the thing
WJth hoth feet.
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Well, Mr. President, I think the time has come
must rrco)nize that in the

~ords

~hen

Cong r ess

of General eisenhower , someth i ng

is "cockeyed" about U.S. troops stntionod ab1·oad.

President

Eisenhower later recognized thllt chunge was Justified.

Ue stated

in 1963 that one U.S. division woulct be suff1cient to fulfill our
comm1t men t l o Nl\TO .
It

is evident from these indicia of engagement with the Soviet

Un1on nnd Eastern Europe that the tension that existed in the early
·sn•s has changed s1.gnificantly .
Tt

is t1me that the IJ.S . recognized the ex:tstence of its own

policy Loward Lhc East .

The policy of this rJoverrunent should be

consistent , not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in trade
a1cl cultural exchnnge and confrontaLJ.on in m1lltary matters .

There

should be but one barometer by which this government guides its
actions toward the East .
But we have many barometers that provide such differen t
f:ot- thu .sDme phenomenon .
Olll

policies vis-a- vis the

focus .

readings

Th1s dual standard f:or rationalizing
Eas~ern

bloc cannot withstand thoughtful

If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire

to open markets and develop a mutual interdependency of East and
West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the
economl.C' sphere as they have with increased cultural and educ a tional

-10-

cxc;.-ll<lnCJes.
dec.td£~ .

It is n natural evolutiOn of the events of the past

Dnt ~n Lhe

m1litary sphere- -in Lhe NA'rO structure--what

remains js a stale rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations from
bygone years .
THE MBFR
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our
own officials and those in Europe that some decrease in

u.s .

military presence should take place .
But the time is never right for such action .

Two years ago

the argument was the policy of detente was nnderway and that nothing
should be dono that would disrupt the process, including the
U . S . -USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by Chancellor
Brandt's "Ostpolitik."
Today we find ourselves in a new situation .

Success has been

achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks; the
warsaw and Moscow treaties h a ve been concluded; the status of
Berlin has been regularized ; through the exchanges of visits between
Pres irlrmt N.ixon and Chainnan Brezhnew a new and better climate
has been createrl which allows us to talk about the Cold War in terms
of the past .
Despite this movement , we are being told that this is the
"worst possible time " in which to take any action on the question
of our forces in Europe .

The bargaining chip is back .

Negotiations

-11-

on m1tuJl force reductions are to begLn on October 30th of this
year.
At the outset we 'Nere told by all the experts that MBFR nego-

tla 1on

Wlll be even more

pha&c of SALT.

compl~cated

Host informed and

and lengthy than the first

optimist~c

speculations are that

the OLlt:comu of sul'h negotiations after perhnpn two to three years
rn~qh

be

conn L c i

~·~:

d

1:eduction of no more:: than l0-15% on the part of those
i nvo lvcd.

r ndced,

s~nce

the pre lim ina ry talks--.i. c . , talks as to whether

th<'r·e should be talks--\verc expected to take roughly five weeks

and t.ook «hout five months, my
than dJminl!;hed about MBFR .

skcptic~sm

has been increased rather

I really doubt that the United States

can n"'!mal.n immobilized on Lhe troops quest1.on for a minimum of two
and possibly even four to fiv& years.

So lhe argument to wait for

MUFR r0ally is a postponement of significant action indefinitely.
UNII.ATEMI, AC'r ION
'l'hr. crucstions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they

were unclcrl:.clk'-m in a bilateral framework .
fo1ces,

'l'he positioning of

the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to

tlw other because of different logistical requirements

w~ll

gcneraLe 19 eli ffcrcnt: solutions equa 1 to the number of participants
at the conference .

So the complexity of l-1Bl'R is magnified 19 times.

-12'l'h~

wisdom of Lhe North Atlantic Treaty which left the quast1on

of specific troop conm1itments in t.he NATO command to be decided
unilat:erally hy each country is abandonod 1.n HBFR.

Unilateral

act1on on such a matter is the only practical method.

Any nation

enterinCJ into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only
agrees :in those negotiations to what she deLennines unilaterally
she c«n do or must do in her own national interest .

No negotiation

\oJi th thn Soviet Union would cause the Soviet. Union to reduce any
of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines
that· t hose troops are nE=•eded in the Eastern European countries for
othc r Lhtl.n protection against an external threat .

In like manner,

if Lhn Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops on other
frontiers , or if she desires to divert a greater proportion of her
resourc(~s

to non-military interests, then the

appropr~ate

reductions

by t.hc USSR will be made--but only then .
So unilateral action on our part to reouce U.s. troops in
Europe, while still maintaining our commitment with a more wisely
structured but significantly reduced level of troops could very
well stimulate a similar independently arrived at response on the
part of the soviet Union .
history .

This is not unprecedented in recent

UnilaLeral and indepenoent actions taken by the United

Stales and the soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear tests in the

-13~tno

phetL• pn•c1pital"d similar

const.ruct~vc

independen t r e spons e s

on edch sjde wl11ch ultimntely led to the nuclea r test ban tre a t y .
S

the arq uncnt.s that untlateral action canriot lend to construc tive

rf' un.,.;arranted .

.e

r•sp

Un~Jate1·aJ

nctlon on the part of the Utnted States mig h t pro-

duce sur.pn.sinq and constrllctive results .

Whut people fail t o

realize 1s thaL the Soviet Union , ever s1nce World War II, h a s n o t
onl). been actl.ng, but rcact1ng , vathin 1ts mil1tary estab l is hme n t .
r-1ur.h of the Soviet force was createc'l at a t1mc \vhen the United S t ate,
had c:1t:><lr llUClear superioriLy .

1n

Wc•s t

Most irlLormcd observers , he r e and

c rn Europe , ag rec that the Soviet

Un ton

is considera b l y more

con. cq·vatl vc nn<l suspic1ous than the United Sta tcs because of its

hlstortrnl experiences and the character of its sociely .
V0 L

no ont• seems willing to make allowances for the ine rtia

01

this military conservatism in Lhe USSR.

SlJl

cclll•s by our NATO Conunanders , as well as our political l ead ers ,

regar 1ing n<?ed for NATO

strcn~th

Wa forget

and readiness are read i n qu i te

di [fcrent liqht by the soviet leadership Lhan

a

a sjmpl0 propo:.1tion ,
them,
d •

that the

vJC

intend .

I t seems

llwl thPy trnst us no more than we t r ust

hut \·;c do not seem t.o be able to absorb t h is view a nd

upon it .

nut even mo r e signifl.cant l.S the Europe«n reactio n to any
1

(•mova 1 ot

u.s.

troops from the continent .

1t

is an accepted

•

~ !

,.. ... . ...

t

-14etxJom that the Europeans would follow suit and reduce their
conv('IH:ionnl forces as well.
\vhat

on

~<>

tho threat, then, that requires so many u.s. forces

he Continent.?

vcnt~onal

If thure 1s a t.ruly percelvcd threat of a con-

war from the East, would not our European allies who

arc ·loser to the "threat:" then respond by an accelerated commitment
of resources?

nut no, they would relax as well, accept the detente

and devote more resources to non-military ventures .

Then why

should we, 3,000 miles away, asstUne such arrogance as to percel.ve
a greater threat to Europe than do the Europeans?
I th.ink the quesbon presumes a rat1.onal answer but there is
none.

It ctocs highlight, however, the dominance of the military

pos l.urc in Europe by the United Sta tcs.

Sl.ncc the formation of

NJ\TO, there has never been a Supreme Allied Commander who was nol
an American.

u.s.

perceptions of the threat are tolerated by the

Europcnns and why not--che
the cosL.

u.s.

1.s footing the greatest share of

Since it is really our nuclear response that the

Europeans wish committect, their tolerance for our eccentricities-includin<J Lhe World war II conventional war contingcncy--l.s very
hi~Jh.

-15It ., ift:lPs me why a properly structure l u.s. mil1tary force
of
mov
.1.

~t

r

lP

r •

1su rnn
I

1.

the most Lwo lean, mO)lle d1vt tons, in position to

Hy along the German frontier, wou 1
d

unst: any form of. pressure from

not be even greater
he East .

\lOUld be more realistl.c t.o the type o:L l.rnprobable attack

that m ;ht conce1vabJy come from the East.
force's t<J be

(.!n~Ftqcd

f:rom the b·c;pnning, thus

U1E"! part of the Europeans tlB t
involv~l

in the

~vent

It would perm.Lt American
nllay:~ng

any fears on

the Urntcd Stat. •s would not be

of a quick thrust into W stern Europe.
THE FINANCIAL BUIIDhN

Mr. Pre tdent, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary
train an
c; ·a~.

balance-of-payments costs of our troops stat1oneJ overhclVC del1beratcly left th1s point to one side in cons ideri ng

qt st.1.ons bec1usc I believe the United States -...111 bear the

lltCSL

ncces dry costs t.o fulfill its international obligations .
ltistory w1ll show that!

Our

But I bcl1.eve it iB clear that the United

Statl"' c·an fulfill 1ls international obligations abroad w1th a

s1gn1f1c nt
I

rc~uct1on

of U.S. forces on forei Jn soil.

hclicve a focus on this issue can be qained at last because

of tlw compet.l.tlon for resources at: home.
will

~ved,

But these resources

not by trimming our sails on our 1nternational

obll.qi1ttons but by trinuning the waste from yt.:ars of innttention
to a

ra 1onal in crnat1onal poltcy.
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Tlto SC'natc

1,,

well <tware that the overall costs of our

l"'Cinmttmcnt to Nl\'1'0 amounts to someth1ng 1.n the neighborhood of
$17 }l!..,ll10....!!., in<'ludinq everything except stratcglc forces: that

the

dl.H cL

forces

anmml operating costs for the approximately 300,000 U.S.

<~ctunlly

located in Europe amounts to approximately $4

billion, ancl with equipment , over $7 billion; that the net balance
of payments drain because of the U.S . forces 1n Europe is approximately $1.5 billion annually; and that these figures are growing
c1ai ly because of t1-e United States • disadvantage because of
inflation, succnssive devaluations of the dollar and other
wcakenings .
A retut'n to rationality on the part of the United States and
its forces abroad would yield a very significant savings in
resources to the United States.

I have deliberately not addressed

myself to the issue of whether the troops that should be removed
from forc1gn soil should be demobilized.

I t is my opinion that a

very sound international policy for t.he United States could be
implemented with a reduction of 50% of the approximately 500 , 000
Lroops stationed on foreign soil.
The return of approximately 250 , 000 military personnel would
reflect the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing
international and domest i c ob l igations and therefore appropriate
for demobilization .

But I don ' t think that the question of

-17d~mob1l1zat1on

has to be directly addressed at this time since I

h 11 vc the pre sures of obta1nJnq a tntll.tary armed force without

Lhc drnft will toil qrcat.: extent resolve Lhe l.ssue of demobilization.
CONCLUSION

r-1r. Pres 1.dent, the time has come to set aside the rhetoric
of the cold W<u used to justify a status guo of military involvement
<1 ronnct

the' wo r 1d.

The l:.irllc lms come to rocogn1zc action that is long overdue,
and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multinatl.onal
nCJO 1ations that could take a decade or longer to reconunend less

Lhnn .... hat is ju5t:l. fied today.
1 t; is

t.ime now to respond to the sp1ri t of detente, to the

stlcccss of tlHC\ Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of
Lurope, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more
fully to the 1\(w<ls of our own people at horne.
I

u 1·ge the adoption of the amendment. .

..

..
E\'F.NTS FROM 1963 TO 1973 WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRlBtrrED
TO THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETh'F.EN EAST AND \lEST
Rcncwnl of Franco-Soviet trade agrccoent. February 1973 • .
:, U.S.-U.S.s.R. agreement to establish an emergency conu:runications
link (hot line). June 1963.
,='

'l'rJp.lrt1te treaty banning nuclear weapons teats in the atmosphere,
ln outrr space, and under water.

October 1963 .

Approvnl hy President Kennedy of U.S. wheat snl~s to the

.1./

U.S . S.R. October 1963.
~

U.S.-U.S . S.R. agreement of exchanges in the scientific, technical,

educational, cultural, and other fields.

February 1964. (

1

u.S. rcRtorcs HFN treatment to Yugoslavia ancl Polnnd.

'I

Renawnl of U.S.-U . S.S.R. trade agreement. April 1964.

~

U.S. Romanian trade discussions.

~)

March 1964.

May 1964·

U.S.-U.S.S.R. com;ular agreement. Sigucd .June 1964 . Ratified Harch 1967.
I (

french-Soviet

t

r.1dc agreement . September 19M•.

U.S.-U . S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in denn1inntlon of sea water.
November 1964 •
• ·'

Hul'f1,1\~

Pact Pol1 tical Consultative Committee npproval of the

Rapacki suggestion for a conference on European security .
.January 1965.
Franco-Soviet color

television agreement. March 1965.

Italo-Soviet agreement on joint cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic
cnerr,y. October 1965.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular convention. December 1965.
ltnlo-Sovlet cultural agreement. February 1966.
' ltalo-Soviet economic , scientific, and technical cooperation agreement.
Apr:ll 1966 .

2

; { Yus•oslnvin b~comes full C(1ntract1nr, p trty to GATT. April 1966.
Dt• r.nulli"'A visit: to the U. S.S.R. June 1966.

,

Frunco-Sovlet scientific, technical , and economic agreement . June 1966.
rrunco-Sovlct spocc research agreement . June 1966 .
.:: Fl.tt-Sovlct agreement for construction of a Flat factory in Russia .
August 1966.
Rcn~ult

dnd Peugeot agreements with the U.S.S . R. regarding cooperation

with Soviet motor industry. October 1966.
~~

Ko~ygin's

visit to France. December 1966.

~ /Franco-Soviet consular agreement . December 1966.
Establisl~ent

of joint Franco-Soviet permanent commission . December 1966.

J:stablishml!nt of Joint Franco-Soviet chamber of commerce . December 1966
North Atlnntic Ministerial Council declaration emphasizing a willingness
to explore ways of developing coopetatlun with the U. S . S. R. and

the states of Eastern Europe. December 1966.
Franco-Soviet atomic energy cooperation agreement. January 1967.
Franco-Soviet trade agreement . January 1967.
KcJHygin visit to the United Kingdom. February 1967.
P.mf:lni visit to Moscow. May 1967.
lt~lo-Sovict ~r,reement

on cooperation in tourism. May 1967.

Italo-Soviet consular convention. 'tolay 1967.
Poland becomes full contracting member of GATT. June 1967 .
U.K.-U.S.S.R. establish London-Moscow teleprinter line. August 1967.
~

llarmel Report of North Atlantic Council proposes discussion of mutual
and

1
'

balanced force reductions in Central Europe. December 1967.

Announcl•mcnt of plans for joint Franco-Soviet space research. January 1968.

3

. Prir.e Hinistcr Hilson's visit to the U.S.S.R. January 1968 .
U.K.-U . S.S . R. ::.cientific and technoloP,ical ngret•mcnt. January 1968.
H1\TO cler:l.tr.tt

ion calling for discussions of mutual .md balanced force

reductions . June 1968 .
Signature of the non- proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons. July 1968 .
Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the State of Bavaria
and lhc U. S. S. R. SeptembeT 1968 .
U. K.-U.S . S.R. civil air agreement. December 1969.
Fr:mC'o-Sovtct civil air agreement . Dc>cember 1969 .
Ita lo- Sovit'l Long- term agreement on the supply of Soviet natural
gas to Ttaly . December 1969 .
Soviet-West German agreement s on supply of Soviet natural gas to
\-lest Germany . February 1970 .
Opening in Vienna of U. S.-U. S. S.R. negotiations on strategic arms
limitation (SALT) . April 1970 .
Nt\TO decl:tration on mutual and balanced force reductions . May 1970.
Signing of non-aggression trea t y between t:he Federa l Republic of Germany
and the Sovi et Union . August 1970 .
President Pompidou ' s visit to the U.S.S.R . October 1970 .
Signing of Franco- Soviet protocol on Franco-Soviet political
cooperation. October 1970.
Signing of treaty of normalization of relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and Poland . December 1970 .
r.rention of a new basis for SALT negotiations.
Ou~ter

~by

1971.

of hard-line East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht. Hay 1971.

•'

Ht•r.umpt:lon of SALT negotiations. July 1971.

Sov f et-t<le::~l Germ:m agreemcn t

I

o open consul.\ tea in Hamburg and Leningrad •

•July 1971.
S lgn.tt.:ur<' of f 1rst part of quadripartite agreement on Derl1.n . September 1971.

"" Chnnccllor Br.~ndt's visit to the U. S.S.R. September 1971.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. ngreement on exchanging information on
certain mlssile testing activities. September 1971 .
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on improving the "hot line" between Washington
and

' :

Mo~cow.

September 1971.

SPcrctary Bre,hnev's visit to France. October 1971.
Frnnco-Sov1ct ngreement on economic , technical and industrial cooperation.
October 1971.
Romanin becomes a full contracting party to

C~TT .

November 1971.

Soviet-\-lest Germnn civil air agreement. November 1971.
lt:ltification by the West German parliament o( the

\~est

German treaties

with the Soviet Union and Poland. 1-tay 1972.
President Nixon's visit to Moscow. Nay 1972.
(

I

U.S . -U . S.S.R.

~greement

on cooperation in the exploration of outer

space . t-tay 1972 .

t ) U.S . -U.S.S . R. 1greement on cooperation in solving problems of
the environment. May 1972 .
U. S. -U.S.S.R. agreement on joint efforts in the field of medical science
and public health. May 1972.
U.S.-U.S.S . R. agreement on expanded cooperation in science and technology
and the establishment of a joint commission for this purpose . May 1972.

:t

."

•

J

5

U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation hetween the American and Soviet
navies r.o reduce the

chance~

of dangerous incidents. May 1972.

Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972.
Sfr,ning of the final quadripartite agreement on Berlin . June 1972.
U.S . -U.S.S.R . three-year agreement on the export of
U.S . agricultural commodities (especially wheat and feed grains).
July 1972.
Suttlement of U.S . S.R. lend-lease obligationq, October 1972.
I

'

U. S.-U.S.S.R . maritime agreement. Octoher 1972.
Signing of U. S. -U.S.S.R. commercial treaty. October 1972.
Qu;tdripart lte declaration supporting F.ast \lnd l-lest German membership
in lhc United Nations. Novembor
S lgning

or

1972.

the basic treaty on rei at ions hct\-leen the Federal Republic

of C:l•nnany ond the Ger.man Democratic. Republic. December 1972.
Opl"!ning of preparatory talks in Vienna for negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions . January 1973.
Sov Lat-l~e>:-;L German 10-year agreement on the dev<'lopment of economic,
indu~trial,

and technical cooperation, and cultural and

educational exchanges. Hay 1973 .
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IN TilE SENATE OF TilE U!\ITED STATES

neterred to

U1o Commit.t('Q on - - - -- -- - - - - - - and ordered to be printed.

Ordered to lio on tho t.nblu nnd l.o bo print.od.
• t

AIV~EI~TlD lVJEI\J1C
~~~SFir:LD
Intended to be proposed by :\h·. ___:..::.:.:;..;;~=~-------·----·-···-···
t i&Mn

U'-' • -.f~U bot:ow)

to£ X.X.X.X.X.Xx.x.xxxx.J<;xtbill
n.n._2~~61i __,anAct to nu:.hori7.c appropriations cturing
the fi£cal year 19"i 1 for procurcr.cnt or aircraft., mi"'f"ilcs, naval
vc~scls, tracked co~oat vehicles, tory>cf.ocs , and other weapons,
t~nd :·.. scorch, dt>velopmen• . t(>st anf. nvalua tion for the Armed Forces 1
vi1-'P0lYliii{!((XXXXifMXvx;qns~. ,"'t:r~'(iollb'i\'ii\f.~ ond t.o prescribe the authorized pcr!;onne\ ~n.ren~t.h fm· cacn nc~;1ve duty co:r.poncnt and of the
Selected Reserve o:' each reserve co:r.poncnt of the Armed Forces,
and the military treining student loads, and for other purposes ,

viz:

At the appropriat-e place in the bill incert a new section

as follo.,.rs:
(a) The Secretary of Defcnoe shall take such

Sec .

action as may be necessary to reduce, by not less than 50 per
centum , the number of military forces of the United States assigned
to duty in foreign countries on March 1, 1973 .

Such reduction

chall be completed not la te r than June 30, 1976; and not less than
one-fourth of the t.otal

~·eduction

required to be made shall com-

pleted prior to July 1, 1974, and not less than one - half of such
t.ott•l reduction shall be completed prior ·o July 1 , 1975.
(b) ::otwiths:.andin& ar.y ot.hcr provision of law, no funds may
be expended on or after July 1 ,

1971~,

to support. or maintain mil i-

tary forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign
countries if the

nu~ber o~

such forces so assigned to such duty

on or after cuch dat.e exceeds a number equal to the number of
such forces oasir,ned to such duty on Mnrch 1, 1973, reduced by
such number as

n~cessary

to co:r.ply \otith the provisions of sub-

ocction (a) of this section .
Amdt. No.

liNaT~I•'•rAll., Sa tii\Tr.

OfiiU. Of ltllll I!KAJitL CCili~SU.
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(c) As used in this section, the •erm

11 ~ilitary

fo r ces of'

the Unit.ed S+-ates'' shall not include personnel ass!gned l;O
duty aboard naval vessels of the Unil;cd States .

